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INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2005, Judge Eugene Arthur Moore of the
Probate Court of Oakland County, Michigan, ordered Yahoo!,
Inc. (Yahoo), an electronic mail (e-mail) service provider, to
deliver the contents of any and all e-mail, documents, and
photos stored in the account of Justin Ellsworth, a deceased
Yahoo user, to his father via CD-ROM and written format.1 On
May 20, 2005, Justin’s father, John Ellsworth, reported to the
court that he had received a CD-ROM and three bankers boxes
of Justin’s e-mail.2 Among the more than 10,000 pages of
material sent by Yahoo, Justin’s father found correspondence
from people he had never even heard of.3
When Justin Ellsworth initially established his account
with Yahoo, he chose a password to protect his account from
unauthorized access.4 Given the events following his death, it is
clear that Justin never shared his password with his father.
Additionally, in order to establish his account, Justin
agreed with Yahoo’s terms of service, which provide in relevant
part:

1. Order to Produce Information, In re Estate of Ellsworth, No. 2005-296,
651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. Mar. 4, 2005).
2. Inventory, In re Estate of Ellsworth No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich.
Prob. Ct. May 11, 2005). The inventory does not indicate whether the e-mail
was solely from the account inbox, or also contained sent e-mail, drafts of email, or e-mail in a trash folder. E-mail in a trash folder would present an
even stronger case for barring access under my analysis in Part IV. See Paul
Sancya, Yahoo Will Give Family Slain Marine’s E-mail Account, USA TODAY
(Apr. 21, 2005, 12:49 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-0421-marine-e-mail_x.htm?POE=TECISVA (noting that Yahoo said it would
provide both incoming and outgoing messages).
3. Sancya, supra note 2.
4. See Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO!, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/
yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2012) (“You will receive a
password and account designation upon completing the Yahoo Service’s
registration process. You are responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of
the password and account and are fully responsible for all activities that occur
under your password or account.”).
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No Right of Survivorship and Non-Transferability. You agree
that your Yahoo account is non-transferable and any rights to your
Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate upon your
death. Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate, your account
may be terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.5

Justin died on November 13, 2004,6 at age twenty,7 while
serving in the armed forces of the United States in Iraq.8 He
was not married and did not have children.9 He also did not
have a valid Last Will and Testament when he died.10 John
Ellsworth,
Justin’s
father,
was
appointed
Personal
Representative of Justin’s estate11 and sought access to the
contents of his son’s e-mail account.12 Although it was widely
reported in the press that he sought access to Justin’s e-mail to
create a scrapbook,13 the Petition to Produce Information filed
by John Ellsworth does not cite sentimental reasons for access.
Instead, the petition states that the e-mail account “may
contain information relating to the administration, settlement,
and internal affairs of the Estate, including information that
may be useful in determining the assets and liabilities of the
Estate or for preparing tax returns or other documents for the

5. Id. Because In re Estate of Ellsworth does not establish when Justin
Ellsworth created his account, the precise wording of the terms he agreed to is
unknown. However, Yahoo reserves the right to modify the terms without
notice. Id.
6. Order of Formal Proceedings, In re Estate of Ellsworth, No. 2005-296,
651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. Jan. 13, 2005).
7. Petition for Probate and/or Appointment of Personal Representative,
In re Estate of Ellsworth, No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. Dec. 22,
2004).
8. Petition to Produce Information, In re Estate of Ellsworth, No. 2005296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. Apr. 20, 2005).
9. Testimony of Interested Persons, In re Estate of Ellsworth, No. 2005296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. Dec. 22, 2004).
10. Order of Formal Proceedings, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. Petition to Produce Information, supra note 8.
13. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, After Death, a Struggle for Their
Digital Memories, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A58836-2005Feb2.html. For the Ellsworth family-maintained
website honoring Justin Ellsworth, see Justin’s Family Fights Yahoo Over
Access to His E-mail Account, http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/
yahoofight.htm (last modified Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Justin’s Family
Fights Yahoo] (containing links to more than thirty news articles that
highlight sentimental reasons for access, such as creating a scrapbook and
knowing what Justin Ellsworth was thinking during his final days). None of
the articles mention ease of estate administration as the reason access was
sought. See, e.g., id.
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decedent or the Estate.”14 Yahoo complied with the court order,
despite the violation of its terms of service, but stated that it
would “continue to uphold [its] privacy commitment to [its]
users.”15
In the nine years following the Ellsworth case, no other
case regarding access to decedents’16 e-mail has garnered public
attention the way the Ellsworth case did;17 however, there is
now substantial national momentum in state legislatures to
grant personal representatives access to decedents’ e-mail as a
part of a larger grant of access to all digital assets.18 In this
Article, I make the case against such a default rule granting
access to decedents’ e-mail.
In the past nine years, Yahoo has not softened its position
towards those who seek access to a Yahoo user’s e-mail post
mortem.19 However, the other two largest e-mail service
providers have more lenient policies on access to decedents’

14. Petition to Produce Information, supra note 8.
15. Dead Marine’s E-mail Raises Legal Issues, FOX NEWS.COM (Apr. 22,
2005),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/04/22/dead-marine-e-mail-raiseslegal-issues/.
16. I use the term “decedent” to refer to a person who dies testate (with a
valid Last Will and Testament) or intestate (without a valid Last Will and
Testament). I use the term “personal representative” to refer to an executor or
administrator of an estate, duly appointed by a probate court. “Access” means
electronic copies of account contents; no one is arguing that a personal
representative should be able to continue to use the account, although in at
least one case, the family of the deceased wanted access to the e-mail address
book so that survivors could contact the deceased’s friends through their own
accounts. See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
17. Cf. Cha, supra note 13 (describing similar circumstances regarding
two other deceased members of the armed forces, but noting that the
resolution of the disputes is unknown).
18. See GGTM Law, Proposed Legislation Would Allow Personal
Representatives Access to Online Accounts, GIELOW, GROOM, TERPSTRA &
MCEVOY (May 17, 2013), http://ggtmlaw.com/proposed-legislation-wouldallow-personal-representatives-access-to-online-accounts/;
KSE
FOCUS,
States Examine Laws Governing Digital Accounts After Death, CONGRESS.ORG
(June
13,
2013),
http://congress.org/2013/06/13/states-examine-lawsgoverning-digital-accounts-after-death/;
see
also
Decedents’
Estates,
SACRAMENTO COUNTY PUB. L. LIBR., http://www.saclaw.lib.ca.us/pages/
decedents-estates.aspx#encyclopedias (last updated Oct. 2013) (explaining
that “decedent” refers to anyone who has died, whether with a will (testate) or
without a will (intestate) and “personal representative” is a broad term that
includes both executors of testate estates and administrators of intestate
estates.).
19. Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 4 (showing that the terminationupon-death provision was not modified as of March 16, 2012, and remains in
place at the time of this writing).
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e-mail.20 In Part I of this Article, I examine the service
providers’ perspectives on access to decedents’ e-mail.
Commentators are overwhelmingly supportive of access by
personal representatives.21 They typically position Internet
service providers, those providers’ terms of service, and secret
passwords chosen by the deceased as stumbling blocks to
efficient estate administration, the preservation of unique and
irreplaceable sentimental and historical data, and the transfer
of valuable property into the hands of deserving family
members.22 I explore these arguments for access in Part II.
Beginning with Connecticut in 2005, seven states have
enacted statutes granting personal representatives some level
of access to decedents’ digital assets, including e-mail.23 As of
October 2013, about a dozen additional states—including
Justin Ellsworth’s home state of Michigan—have pending
legislation that grants personal representatives access to
decedents’ e-mail.24 Additionally, in January 2012, the Uniform
Law Commission created a committee to “study the need for a
feasibility of state legislation on fiduciary powers and authority

20. See My Family Member Died Recently/Is in Coma, What Do I Need to
Do?, MICROSOFT COMMUNITY (Mar. 15, 2012), http://answers.microsoft.com/
en-us/outlook_com/forum/oaccount-omyinfo/my-family-member-died-recentlyis-in-coma-what-do/308cedce-5444-4185-82e8-0623ecc1d3d6 (“The Microsoft
Next of Kin process allows for the release of Outlook.com contents . . . to the
next of kin of a deceased or incapacitated account holder and/or closure of the
Microsoft account, following a short authentication process.”); Accessing a
Deceased Person’s Mail, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/mail/answer/
14300?hl=en (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (“The application to obtain email
content is a lengthy process with multiple waiting periods. If you are the
authorized representative of a deceased person and wish to proceed with an
application to obtain the contents of a deceased person’s Gmail account, please
carefully review the following information regarding our two stage
process . . . .”).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a
Decedent’s E-mails: Inheritable Probate Assets or Property or the Network?, 10
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 291–97 (2007); Charles Herbst, Death in
Cyberspace, RES GESTAE, Oct. 2009, at 16, 18; Michael Walker & Victoria D.
Blachly, Virtual Assets, in REPRESENTING ESTATE AND TRUST BENEFICIARIES
AND FIDUCIARIES 175, 182 (ALI-ABA ed., 2011).
23. See infra Part III for discussion, and see reprint of statutes at the end
of this Article. The seven states are Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Nevada,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
24. See infra Part III for pending legislation.

902

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

to access digital information.”25 The committee is now
operating with the mission to draft an act that “will vest
fiduciaries with at least the authority to manage and distribute
digital assets, copy or delete digital assets, and access digital
assets,”26 and has developed a working draft that grants
personal representatives access to password-protected e-mail
accounts of the deceased (the Draft Uniform Act).27 I examine
the current laws, legislation, and Draft Uniform Act in Part III.
In Part IV, I highlight the problems with, and new issues
raised by, the access laws, proposed laws, and the Draft
Uniform Act, and explore the problems with the arguments for
access to decedents’ e-mail.
I then assert that the commentary, statutes, and proposed
legislation fail to adequately consider decedents’ intent, or
probable intent, which is the bedrock of estate jurisprudence. I
argue that storing e-mail in a password-protected account,
coupled with nondisclosure of that password by the deceased, is
an exercise of a decedent’s right to destroy his or her own
property. Further, I maintain that state law and the Draft
Uniform Act granting access to decedents’ e-mail
inappropriately infringe upon this right. I conclude in Part V
with a recommendation for an alternative default rule.
I. PROVIDERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON ACCESS TO
DECEDENTS’ E-MAIL
The issue of access arises in situations where a decedent
did not share his or her password, and the decedent’s personal
representative, heirs, or beneficiaries contact the decedent’s email service provider to request access.28

25. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, MIDYEAR MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCOPE
PROGRAM MINUTES 5 (2012), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/scope/ScopeMinutes_012012.pdf.
26. Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Fiduciary%20Access%20to
%20Digital%20Assets (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
27. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, FIDUCIARY
ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT 6–7 (Proposed Draft Mar. 3, 2014)
[hereinafter MARCH 2014 DRAFT UNIFORM ACT], available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital
%20Assets/2014mar_FADA_Mtg%20Draft.pdf.
28. Dead Marine’s E-mail Raises Legal Issues, supra note 15.
AND
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Google, Inc., Yahoo, and Microsoft, Inc., are the leading email service providers,29 and they operate Gmail, Yahoo, and
Outlook.com,30 respectively. While all three service providers
disclaim ownership of e-mail account content to some degree in
their respective terms of service, the service providers differ in
their policies concerning access to e-mail after an account
holder’s death.
A. CONTENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE DECEDENT
All three e-mail service providers declare in their
respective terms of service that the service provider does not
own the content provided by the user—the content belongs to
the user.31 Yahoo simply states, “Yahoo does not claim
ownership of Content you submit or make available for
inclusion on the Yahoo Services.”32 Outlook.com’s terms of
service provide: “Except for material that we license to you that
may be incorporated into your own content (such as clip art),
we do not claim ownership of the content you provide on the
services. Your content remains your content, and you are
responsible for it.”33 The Gmail terms of service indicate to the
user: “You retain ownership of any intellectual property rights
that you hold in that content. In short, what belongs to you
stays yours.”34
The Gmail terms of service (perhaps unintentionally)
highlight an important point: “e-mail” is really several different
kinds of property. When a person sends an e-mail, he retains a
copyright in that literary digital transmission.35 A copy of the
copyrighted work is generally maintained in the creator’s “sent

29. Mark Brownlow, E-mail and Webmail Statistics, E-MAIL MARKETING
REP., http://www.e-mail-marketing-reports.com/metrics/e-mail-statistics.htm
(last updated Dec. 2012).
30. Hotmail was merged into Outlook.com. See Hotmail, MICROSOFT,
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/hotmail/hotmail-help (last visited Feb. 15,
2014).
31. See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/
en/policies/terms/ (last modified Nov. 11, 2013); Microsoft Services Agreement,
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-live/microsoftMICROSOFT,
services-agreement (last updated Aug. 27, 2012); Yahoo Terms of Service,
supra note 4.
32. Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 4.
33. Microsoft Services Agreement, supra note 31.
34. Google Terms of Service, supra note 31.
35. See Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 284–91 (discussing copyright
law and e-mail).
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e-mail” folder.36 The recipient of the e-mail then also receives a
copy of the copyrighted work in his or her e-mail inbox.37 Thus,
a decedent’s “e-mail” consists of copyrighted work, copies of
copyrighted work, and copies of others’ copyrighted works. It
seems clear from the providers’ policies above that the
copyright is indeed retained by the user.38 After the user’s
death, the user’s estate controls the copyright to any e-mails he
or she authored.39 For instance, a pen pal of Justin Ellsworth
could not publish a book that includes e-mail authored by
Justin Ellsworth without his estate’s permission.40
The property right in the copyright is discrete from the
property right in the copy of the copyrighted work.41 The debate
over access to e-mail is not about the copyright held by
decedents’ estates; it is about the copies.42 Although it might be
more difficult for heirs or beneficiaries to reap financial benefit
from the copyright without access to a copy of the e-mail, this is
also the case with tangible letters.43 For example, when I write
a letter and send it through the mail, the recipient has the only
copy of my copyrighted work, and in order for my family to reap
financial benefit from my letter, the recipient must produce the
copy.
Looking at the language in the terms of service above, it is
unclear whether the providers are acknowledging that the
copyright belongs to the user, or that the copyright and the
copies of the copyrighted works also belong to the user. But
even if the providers acknowledge that the copies belong to the
user, the providers’ policies (in the terms of service contract
with the user and elsewhere) limit the right to access those
copies after the user’s death in different ways.
The three providers approach the death of the user in
markedly different policies. Yahoo’s terms of service are the
most explicitly anti-access. They state:
No Right of Survivorship and Non-Transferability. You agree
that your Yahoo account is non-transferable and any rights to your
Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate upon your
36. Id. at 289–90.
37. Id. at 290.
38. Id. at 288.
39. Id. at 292–93 (finding that e-mail provider terms of service are
unlikely to constitute a copyright transfer from the deceased to the provider).
40. This is an illustrative hypothetical example.
41. Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 298.
42. Id. at 293.
43. Id. at 294.
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death. Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate, your account
may be terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.44

Microsoft’s policy is not contained in its terms of service,
but instead in a question and answer forum for users. This
policy grants the greatest possibility for access, by a variety of
people:
The Microsoft Next of Kin process allows for the release of
Outlook.com contents, including all emails and their attachments,
address book, and Messenger contact list, to the next of kin of a
deceased or incapacitated account holder and/or closure of the
Hotmail account, following a short authentication process. We
cannot provide you with the password to the account or change the
password on the account, and we cannot transfer ownership of the
account to the next of kin. Account contents are released by way of
a data DVD which is shipped to you.45

The answer continues by explaining that to begin the Next of
Kin process, a person seeking access to the contents of an
Outlook.com account will need the decedent’s death certificate,
“a [d]ocument showing that you are the user’s next of kin
and/or executor or benefactor [sic] of their estate,”46 photo
identification, the approximate date when the account was
created and when it was last accessed, and the e-mail address
or addresses, the first and last name, date of birth and city,
state, and zip code that the account holder used when creating
the account.47 The instructions further note that if the account
has been inactive more than thirteen months, the account itself
is deleted in most cases and access to content will be
impossible.48 Finally, Microsoft cautions next of kin “that we
can only allow a total of three (3) attempts to pass the
verification process.”49
Like Microsoft, Gmail’s policy appears in a help forum and
does not appear in the terms of service to which users agree.50
Unlike Microsoft, however, Google indicates that the process is
lengthy with “multiple waiting periods” and access to content is
not guaranteed.51 “If you need access to the Gmail account
content of an individual who has passed away, in rare cases we
44. Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 4.
45. My Family Member Died Recently/Is in Coma, What Do I Need to Do?,
supra note 20.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Accessing a Deceased Person’s Mail, supra note 20.
51. Id.
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may be able to provide the contents of the Gmail account to an
authorized representative of the deceased person.”52
In addition to identifying information, a person must
submit a copy of an e-mail (with full header information) that
was sent from the decedent’s e-mail account to the submitter’s
e-mail account.53 Google warns that “[a]fter a review, you will
be notified by e-mail and informed whether we will be able to
move beyond Part 1 to the next steps of the process. In some
cases, this waiting period may take up to a few months.”54
Further, “[i]f we are able to move forward based on our
preliminary review, we will send further instructions outlining
Part 2. Part 2 will require you to get additional legal
documents, including an order from a U.S. court and/or
additional materials.”55
In 2013, Google added an additional feature that Gmail
users may access through Gmail settings: inactive account
manager.56 A Gmail user may add up to ten people (“trusted
contacts”) who are notified after the account is inactive for a
certain period of time chosen by the user; if the user chooses to
share data with any or all of the trusted contacts, they will be
verified and given three months to download the data shared
with them.57
Thus, while it seems clear that after a user’s death,
copyright in e-mail written by the user belongs to the user’s
estate, providers’ policies with regard to copies are murky and
varied. Yahoo’s strict “no access” policy appears in the terms of
service agreed to by the user, but Microsoft’s and Google’s more
lenient policies are hidden in online question and answer
forums.
B. ACCESS VIOLATES THE PRIVACY OF THE DECEDENT
To justify the limitations on access, Yahoo and others deny
access based on a broad concern over the “privacy” of the

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Inactive Account Manager, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/settings/
account/inactive (lasted visited Jan. 27, 2014).
57. Id.
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decedent.58 Although generally a right to privacy does not
extend past death, the Internet e-mail providers’ reference to
“privacy” may be shorthand for the idea that the account holder
contracted with the service provider to protect the privacy of
the account, and the contract to protect privacy survives the
death of the account holder.59
In a letter to the chair of the committee working on the
draft Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (the Draft Uniform
Act),60 two industry associations61 more fully describe the
providers’ concerns with privacy in the context of a critique of
the Draft Uniform Act. They cite the Federal Stored
Communications Act62 (part of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act), which strictly limits the ability of e-mail service
providers to disclose the content of their users’ e-mail. The
letter explains:
It is important to understand that fiduciary access to the
contents of electronic communications—as distinct from the
contents of paper records—is governed by a federal statute called
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), which
imposes sharp limits on Internet companies’ ability to disclose the
contents of communication. The contents of subscriber
communications may not even be disclosed by an Internet company
in response to judicial process in civil litigation. While ECPA
contains limited exceptions that would allow disclosure of the
contents of subscriber communication, whether those exceptions
allow fiduciary access is an entirely unsettled area of law.63

58. See Justin’s Family Fights Yahoo, supra note 13. In the more than
thirty articles posted on the family-maintained website, Yahoo is consistently
quoted as having concern for its users’ privacy. See id.
59. Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 314 (“On the other hand, while a
common law cause of action for invasion of privacy may cease upon death,
general freedom of contract principles suggest that it may still be possible to
create a contractual right of privacy which is effective to protect private
information of deceased individuals.”).
60. Letter from Steve DelBianco et al., Exec. Dir., NetChoice, to Suzanne
B. Walsh, Unif. Law Comm’n (July 8, 2013) [hereinafter DelBianco Letter],
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%
20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013jul_FADA_NetChoice_Szabo%20et%20al_Com
ments.pdf. This draft act is discussed in Part III.C.
61. Id. (“On behalf of NetChoice, a trade association of leading ecommerce businesses, and the State Privacy & Security Coalition, which is
comprised of 20 leading communications, technology and media companies, we
submit the following comments . . . .”).
62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).
63. DelBianco Letter, supra note 60.
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The exceptions referred to above appear in (b)(1) and (b)(3)
of § 2702.64 The first exception allows providers to divulge
contents “to an addressee or intended recipient of such
communication or an agent of such addressee or intended
recipient.”65 The providers caution that “there is no statutory
language, legislative history or case law interpreting section
2702(b)(1) which clarifies the meaning of ‘agent’ and whether it
would apply to a fiduciary of someone who has died.”66
Significantly, this exception refers only to an agent of the
recipient or intended recipient; thus, it does not allow
disclosure to an agent of the originator. In other words, even if
the personal representative of the decedent is considered an
agent of the decedent under this federal statute, it would only
be appropriate for the agent to access incoming messages (for
which the decedent was the recipient) and not outgoing
messages.
The second exception allows for the disclosure of e-mail
content “with the lawful consent of the originator or an
addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the
subscriber in the case of remote computing service.”67 Unlike
the previous exception, “lawful consent” would allow access to
both incoming and outgoing messages. In the view of these
providers, consent should be established only “in a decedent’s
will or if the decedent expressed a preference to share account
information after death in signing up for service.”68
It is unwise, the providers assert, to “assume away” the
ECPA issue by simply declaring that the fiduciary is an agent
or acting with consent of the decedent.69 The providers
continue, “[a]s a factual matter, these decedents did not
actually consent. What is more, because this is a federal law
issue, it is far from clear that a state law enacted years after
ECPA will control how a [sic] courts rule on whether consent
may be assumed.”70 The providers endorse the format of a state
law that allows access to the contents of communications only
after a court designates the executor as an agent under the

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1), (3).
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1).
DelBianco Letter, supra note 60.
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3).
DelBianco Letter, supra note 60.
Id.
Id.
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ECPA and orders that the estate indemnify the provider for all
liability under the order.71
II. ARGUMENTS FOR ACCESS TO DECEDENTS’ E-MAIL
Access to password-protected e-mail is part of a larger
debate72 about access to all of decedents’ digital property.73
This Article is limited to a discussion of password-protected email, but many of the arguments are the same for other
property.74
Commentators use a variety of arguments to justify access
to decedents’ e-mail accounts. The arguments can be grouped
together in two main categories: (A) that access will ease the
burden of estate administration;75 and (B) that e-mail is
property of the decedent—either sentimental and irreplaceable,
or valuable, or both—and the decedent’s family has a right to
inherit that property.76
A. ACCESS REQUIRED TO EASE THE BURDEN OF ESTATE
ADMINISTRATION
Estate planning practitioners, weighing in on access,
commonly argue that access to decedents’ e-mail is necessary
for an orderly administration of an estate; in fact, this was the
argument that the lawyer for the Ellsworth administrator used
in his Petition for Access.77 In materials prepared for an
ALI/ABA continuing legal education seminar, the authors
describe security measures on password-protected accounts as
creating a “serious dilemma” when the account holder dies.78
Similarly, a practitioner writing for a publication of the
Indiana State Bar Association describes three hypothetical
situations where a person could find themselves in a “legal
thicket” without access to a decedent’s e-mail account.79
71. Id.; see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-27-3 (West 2011).
72. Also part of the debate is whether trustees, court-appointed
conservators or guardians of the property, and/or agents under powers of
attorney should be granted access; while many of the arguments are the same,
access by other fiduciaries is beyond the scope of this Article.
73. See, e.g., UNIF. LAW COMM’N, supra note 25.
74. See, e.g., Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 310–11 (comparing the
law of safe deposit boxes).
75. See Walker & Blachly, supra note 22, at 184–85.
76. See Dead Marine’s E-mail Raises Legal Issues, supra note 15.
77. Petition to Produce Information, supra note 8.
78. Walker & Blachly, supra note 22, at 182.
79. Herbst, supra note 22, at 18.
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Another article highlights “the significant disruption that
might result if heirs are denied access to accounts.”80
As I will discuss later, the comments in the Draft Uniform
Act indicate that this justification is the focus of the drafting
committee.81
B. ACCESS REQUIRED BECAUSE E-MAIL IS THE PROPERTY OF THE
DECEDENT
The second type of justification for access to decedents’ email is rooted in the idea that e-mail is property of the decedent
and thus subject to distribution to heirs or beneficiaries.82
Because the debate over access to e-mail involves the copies of
the e-mail and not the copyright,83 when I refer to “e-mail,”
“content,” or “e-mail content,” I am referring to the copies and
not to the copyright.
It seems clear that the e-mail is the property of its creator.
Despite ambiguous language, the e-mail service providers do
not appear to claim to own the e-mail; they merely assert that
the terms of service contracts agreed to by users modify those
users’ rights in that property.84
Additionally, at least one federal district court has ordered
a personal representative to obtain content from a decedent’s email account and justified the order by asserting that the
personal representative has control over all of the decedent’s
property, including e-mail.85 In a 2013 Massachusetts case, the
80. Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 308.
81. See infra Part III.C.
82. A beneficiary takes the property of a decedent’s estate under a Last
Will and Testament; an heir takes under the applicable statute of descent and
distribution in intestacy. DANAYA C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION:
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 5 (2013).
83. See supra Part II.A.
84. See, e.g., Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 4. Under the “Member
Conduct” portion of the terms of service, Yahoo states that content
transmitted is “the sole responsibility of the person from whom such Content
originated. This means that you, and not Yahoo, are entirely responsible for
all Content that you upload, post, e-mail, transmit, or otherwise make
available via the Yahoo services.” Id. However, in the section titled “General
Practices Regarding Use and Storage,” Yahoo does reserve the right to alter
the general practices and set limits in regards to the services they offer. Id.
85. See In re Air Crash, Nos. 09-md-2085, 09-CV-961S, 2011 WL 6370189,
at *5–6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011) (ordering Plaintiff, the decedent’s
representative, to produce any of the decedent’s electronic communications to
Defendant). See generally In re Air Crash, 798 F. Supp. 2d 481 (W.D.N.Y.
2011) (making choice-of-law determinations to govern the broader airplane
crash litigation related to the above Decision and Order).
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issue of whether the contents of the e-mail are property of the
decedent’s estate was remanded to the probate court.86 Finally,
the content of e-mail is likely to be considered property of a
decedent for estate tax purposes.87
The strongest legal argument is made by Professors
Darrow and Ferrera, who argued in 2007 that “e-mail . . . has
not been given sufficient legal protection as an inheritable
probate asset.”88 To justify access to e-mail, Darrow and
Ferrera turn to the law of bailment, comparing e-mail held by
an e-mail service provider to goods stored in a warehouse or in
a safe deposit box.89 This analogy works beautifully to establish
that the contents of e-mail accounts are the property of the
owner of the account and that only possession is being
transferred to the e-mail service provider.90 Darrow and
Ferrera then compare an heir without a password to the e-mail
account to an heir who cannot locate the warehouse receipt or
key to the safe deposit box—in the latter cases, the heirs can
compel return of the property.91

86. See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 615–16 (Mass. App. Ct.
2013). As of October 21, 2013, an order has not been issued in the probate and
family court. Yahoo argued that the Stored Communications Act prevents
disclosure of the contents of e-mail. Id. at 615; see supra Part I.B.
87. See Abigail J. Sykas, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public Policy
Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of Property by Testamentary Direction?, 25
VT. L. REV. 911, 926 & n.144 (2001) (mentioning that the IRS taxed an estate
when the executor destroyed valuable literary work of the decedent at her
request); see also Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 311–12 (arguing that email is property that should be accounted for when determining the gross
estate). Some argue that digital property may be economically valuable. While
this may be true of other digital property such as eBay accounts, frequent
flyer miles or points, photographs, or in-game World of Warcraft-type
property, the value in e-mail, if any, is in the copyright and not the copies. As
a result, this discussion focuses on the argument that e-mail possesses
significant non-economic value. See generally Daniel Gould, Virtual Property
in MMOGs (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://virtuallyblind.com/files/reading-room/gould_virtual_property.pdf
(discussing virtual property in online games).
88. Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 283.
89. Id. at 301–12.
90. Id. at 312 (“The fact that the e-mail is in the possession of a third
party should make no difference, since the gross estate reflects the value of all
property ‘wherever situated.’” (internal citation omitted)).
91. Id. at 307 (“If the heirs are unable to find the key among the
decedent’s possessions, the bank or storage facility would not likely claim that
the heirs have no right to the property.”).
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III. LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPE
Seven states have enacted laws to grant some degree of
access to personal representatives.92 While I have identified
four distinct generations of statutory language, the statutes
have in common that they grant access without identifying
whether access is justified by easing the burden of
administration or because e-mail is the property of the
decedent. Additionally, with the exception of Rhode Island, all
the states ignore the issues posed by the Federal Stored
Communications Act discussed in Part I.B. The statutes were
largely enacted without significant public comment and
perhaps without much public notice.93
A. CURRENT LAW
Connecticut was the leader in access legislation. Its law,
effective in 2005, requires an e-mail service provider to provide
“access to or copies of” the contents of the e-mail account to the
personal representative upon written request of the personal
representative or court order.94 Rhode Island’s law, similarly
uses the “access to or copies of” language.95 In 2007, Indiana
instituted a similar statute, adding a provision requiring the
custodian to maintain the stored information for at least two
years after the request is made by the personal representative
or the estate.96 I refer to “access to or copies of” language as
first-generation language.
92. Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and
Virginia have all passed relevant legislation, with several other states
considering similar laws. See State-by-State Digital Estate Planning Laws,
https://www.everplans.com/tools-and-resources/state-by-stateEVERPLANS,
digital-estate-planning-laws (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (citing Virginia as
having a “proposed law”).
93. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT 1 (2013) (proposed draft)
[hereinafter DRAFT UNIFORM ACT], available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013nov_FADA_
Mtg_Draft.pdf (“Few holders of digital assets and accounts consider the fate of
their online presences once they are no longer able to manage their assets.”);
see also Rob Walker, Cyberspace When You’re Dead, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/magazine/09Immortalityt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing the possible reasons why “[n]ot
many people” have given these issues any serious thought).
94. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a(b) (West 2013).
95. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-27-3 (West 2011).
96. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-13-1.1 (West 2007). “Custodian” means “any
person who electronically stores the documents or information of another
person.” Id. § 29-1-13-1.1(a).
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In 2010, Oklahoma enacted a statute that allows a
personal representative to “take control of, conduct, continue or
terminate” an e-mail account of a decedent “where otherwise
authorized.”97 While language authorizing a personal
representative to “take control” of an account or “continue” an
account is significantly broader than the first-generation
language that would allow an internet provider to merely
provide copies of the contents of the account, Oklahoma added
a significant limitation by requiring that access be “otherwise
authorized.”98 This language has been interpreted to mean that
a donative document must authorize access or a court must
issue an order.99 This is the second-generation language for
access legislation.
Idaho led the third-generation of language with its 2011
law that uses the same broad “take control of, conduct,
continue or terminate” second-generation language, but instead
of the limiting “where otherwise authorized,” Idaho does not
require court authorization or confirmation.100 This thirdgeneration language is the broadest, allowing the most access
(access cannot be satisfied merely by providing copies as is
allowed under first-generation statutes) with the least
authorization (does not need to be granted by the decedent or a
court, and it is unclear under what circumstances a decedent or
court may limit access).
Virginia’s 2013 law is limited to the accounts of a deceased
minor, but limits access if granting access is deemed contrary
to express provisions in a will, trust instrument, power of
attorney, or court order.101 Although Virginia is alone in
limiting access to accounts of minor decedents, the language
granting access unless limited by the decedent or a court
constitutes the fourth generation. Nevada’s bill was introduced

97. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 269 (West 2010).
98. See id.
99. See New Jersey’s interpretation in the comment at the end of A2943,
215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012) (statement), stating that “[i]t is the
sponsor’s intention to clarify that the executor or administrator is authorized
to take necessary or permissible steps, which may include obtaining a court
order, to access the contents of a decedent’s online accounts.”
100. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28) (West 2011); id. § 15-5-424(2)
(providing such authority to conservators by making clear that a conservator
“may act without court authorization or confirmation”).
101. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110(A) (West 2013).
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as a fourth-generation type of statute,102 but the version signed
into law authorizes only termination of the account by the
personal representative.103
B. PENDING LEGISLATION
Access legislation is pending in about a dozen other states,
and bills use second, third, and fourth-generation language.104
A Maine bill merely directs the Probate and Trust Law
Advisory Committee to conduct a review “of the legal
impediments to the disposition of digital assets upon an
individual’s death or incapacity and develop legislative
recommendations based on the review.”105
New Hampshire and New Jersey use second-generation
language like Oklahoma, allowing access “where otherwise
authorized.”106 The Statement at the end of the New Jersey bill
indicates that “[i]t is the sponsor’s intention to clarify that the
executor or administrator is authorized to take necessary or
permissible steps, which may include obtaining a court order,
to access the contents of a decedent’s online accounts.”107 Bills
in Delaware and Michigan are based on the permissive thirdgeneration “take control of, conduct, continue, or terminate”
language, and, like Idaho’s statute, they do not require any

102. S.B. 131, 2013 Leg., 77th Reg. Sess. (as introduced in Nev. on Feb. 18,
2013) (“Subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed in the will of a
decedent or by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, a personal
representative has the power to take control of, conduct, continue, or terminate
any account of the decedent . . . .” (emphasis added)).
103. S.B. 131, 2013 Leg., 77th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013) (enacted) (“This bill
authorizes a personal representative to direct termination of any account of
the decedent . . . .”).
104. Jim Lamm, August 2013 List of State Laws and Proposals Regarding
Fiduciary Access to Digital Property During Incapacity or After Death, DIGITAL
PASSING (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.digitalpassing.com/2013/08/30/august2013-list-state-laws-proposals-fiduciary-access-digital-property-incapacitydeath/ (containing links to legislation and pending legislation as of August
2013). Mr. Lamm notes that California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, and Ohio
have considered or are considering access legislation, but no links are
provided, nor were these bills discovered in a Westlaw search. The author
wishes to thank Mr. Lamm for links to status reports for pending legislation.
105. Legis. Doc. 850, 126th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2013) (enacted).
106. See H.B. 116, 163d Gen. Ct., 2013 Sess. (N.H. 2013); A2943, 215th
Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012).
107. A2943, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012) (statement).
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authorization in a donative document or by the court.108
Pennsylvania and Oregon are fourth-generation statutes that
allow access unless access has been restricted by will or court
order.109
Three different versions of access legislation were
introduced in New York in 2013.110 Legislation introduced in
Massachusetts does not fit squarely within any cohort.
Personal representatives can gain “reasonable access” after
obtaining a court order, but access can be superseded by
provisions in a decedent’s will or opt-out options that show
clearly that the decedent affirmatively declined to grant
access.111
It is worth noting that all of the previous bills but one have
failed to pass so far. Third-generation type bills in Maryland,112
North Dakota,113 and North Carolina114 were rejected by a
committee or the legislature. Additionally, after directing its

108. See H.B. 396, 146th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Del. 2012); H.B.
5929, 96th Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012); see also S. 293, 96th Leg., 2013
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2013).
109. See S. 54, 77th Legis. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013) (explaining
that a personal representative may administer an estate “except as restricted
or otherwise provided by the will of the decedent . . . or by court order”); H.B.
2580, 196th Gen. Assemb., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012) (“A personal
representative shall have the power, unless the personal representatives’
authority has been restricted by will or by court order . . . .”).
110. A823, 200th Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); A6034, 200th Leg.,
2013 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); A6729, 200th Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
111. S. 702, 188th Gen. Ct., 2013 Sess. (Mass. 2013) (“This paragraph shall
not supersede language in the decedent’s will to the contrary.”).
112. S.B. 29, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 433d Sess. (Md. 2013); Senate Judicial
Proceedings Comm., Voting Record—2013 Session, S.B. 29 (Feb. 14, 2013),
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2013RS/votes_comm/sb0029_jpr.pdf
(reporting an “unfavorable” vote by the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee).
113. H.B. 1455, 63d Leg. Assemb., 63d Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013); Bill Actions
for HB 1455, N.D. LEGIS., http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/billactions/ba1455.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (“[F]ailed to pass, yeas 20 nays
27.”).
114. S. 279, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (enacted). The
bill passed, but without previously-included provisions affecting rights to
digital assets in probate cases. Compare id., with S. 279, 2013 Gen. Assemb.,
2013 Reg. Sess. (as introduced in N.C. on Mar. 12, 2013), available at http://
www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Senate/PDF/S279v0.pdf. As introduced,
North Carolina’s bill used first-generation language but with an important
distinction that makes it a third-generation statute: instead of “access to or
copies of,” which would allow an e-mail service provider to send a CD rather
than providing control of the account, North Carolina grants access to, and
copies of, the contents of the account. Id.
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Judiciary Committee to conduct a study and provide its
findings and recommendations to the legislature or legislative
counsel,115 the Nebraska legislature has “indefinitely
postponed”116 consideration of a fourth-generation-style
statute.117
C. THE DRAFT UNIFORM ACT
The stated purpose of the draft of the Fiduciary Access to
Digital Assets Act (the Draft Uniform Act) is to “vest fiduciaries
with the authority to access, manage, distribute, copy or delete
digital assets and accounts.”118 It uses fourth-generation
language for access by personal representatives and broadens
access beyond personal representatives to conservators, agents
under powers of attorney, and trustees.119
Five versions of the Draft Uniform Act have been posted to
the Uniform Law Commission website.120 The first version,
dated November 13, 2012, was drafted as an amendment to the
Uniform Probate Code and has been revised in both form and
substance.121 The second version, dated February 7, 2013, was
drafted to be a stand-alone act, but has also been largely
revised in substance.122 The May 31, 2013 third version of the
draft was released for comment before the July 2013 meeting of
the National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.123
115. See LB783—Change Provisions Relating to Powers of Personal
Representatives, NEB. LEGIS., http://www.nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view_
bill.php?DocumentID=15623 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (referring the possible
changes to the Judiciary Committee on January 9, 2012).
116. Id. (stating that the proposed changes are “indefinitely postponed” as
of Apr. 18, 2012).
117. L.B. 783, 102d Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2012) (allowing a personal
representative to control a deceased person’s account “unless the personal
representative’s authority has been restricted by will or by court order”).
118. DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 93, at 1.
119. See id.
120. See Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, supra note 26.
121. DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 93, at 1.
122. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT PREFATORY NOTE 1 (Proposed
Draft Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013feb7_FADA_MtgDraft_S
tyled.pdf (“While an earlier draft focused on amendments to existing uniform
laws in this area, this draft is designed to be a stand-alone act.”).
123. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT (Proposed Draft May 31, 2013)
[hereinafter
MAY
2013
DRAFT
UNIFORM
ACT],
available
at
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The third version of the Draft Uniform Act began with
definitions.124 Significantly, a bracketed sentence to be
considered by the drafting committee appeared after the
definition of “digital property”: “The term does not include the
contents of an electronic communication.”125 This bracketed
option was quite important; it demonstrates that the committee
was considering the distinction in the Stored Communications
Act between customer records and content of communication.126
The third version of the Draft Uniform Act also contained
two alternative provisions for section 4. In the first (Alternative
A), drafted to respond to concerns of Internet service
providers,127 personal representatives were authorized to
“exercise control over digital property of the decedent” and gain
access to content “to the extent not inconsistent with 18 U.S.C.
Section 2702(b)(3).”128 Like other fourth-generation statutes,
access was limited as prohibited by will or unless otherwise
prohibited by a court.129 Because the consent requirement
contained in § 2702(b)(3) is the hot button issue for the
providers, including “to the extent not inconsistent with”
language, and therefore leaving unclear who has authority to
determine consistency or inconsistency, meant that Alternative
A provided little clarity on the subject of access. In denying
access under an Alternative A-style statute, service providers
like Yahoo are likely to continue to rely on the fact that
decedents do not explicitly consent to access by personal
representatives. Alternative B was a more typical fourthgeneration
provision,
which
authorizes
personal
representatives to “access, manage, deactivate and delete the
digital property of the decedent,” unless otherwise limited by
will, court order, or another state law.130
The service providers were able to influence the drafting
committee to except contents of an electronic communication
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital
%20Assets/2013AM_FADA_Draft.pdf.
124. See id. at 1–2.
125. Id. at 2.
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (2012) (defining “customer records” as
information pertaining to a subscriber or customer that does not include
contents of communication).
127. MAY 2013 DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 123, at 7–8. Information is
contained under “Comments for the Committee.”
128. Id. at 6.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 7.
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from the definition of a digital asset in the fourth version of the
Draft Uniform Act, dated October 22, 2013.131 This fourth draft
defines electronic communication132 and differentiates a
personal representative’s authority over digital assets, records
of electronic communication, and the contents of electronic
communication.133 While personal representatives may obtain
digital assets and records of electronic communication,134 they
may only obtain contents of electronic communication “to the
extent consistent with” the Stored Communications Act.135
Once obtained, the personal representative is authorized to
“access, manage, deactivate and delete” what is obtained.136
Similarly, section 4 of the fifth draft, dated March 3, 2014,
allows a personal representative to “access . . . (2) the content of
electronic communications . . . if the electronic communication
service or remote computing service is permitted under 18
U.S.C. Section 2702(b) to disclose the content.”137 Once a
personal representative has satisfied the requirements of the
Draft Uniform Act to request access, new language in section 9
directs a custodian to comply with the fiduciary’s request for
“access,” “control,” or “a copy”138 of the asset within sixty
days.139 While the sixty day deadline is new, the language
allowing access if it “is permitted” under federal law in the fifth

131. See DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 93. “Digital Asset” under the
fourth draft means:
a) information created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or
stored by electronic means on a digital device or system that delivers
digital information, and includes a contract right; and b) an electronic
system for creating, generating, sending, receiving, storing,
displaying, or processing information which the account holder is
entitled to access.
Id. at 1.
132. The Act defines “electronic communication” as:
[A] transfer of a sign, signal, writing, image, sound, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system. The
term does not include wire or oral communication; any
communication made through a tone-only paging device; or any
communication from a tracking device.
Id. at 2.
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. MARCH 2014 DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 27, at 6–7.
138. Id. at 14.
139. Id. at 15.
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draft140 is not meaningfully different than the language in the
fourth draft permitting access “to the extent consistent with”
federal law.141
Section 8 of the fourth version of the Draft Uniform Act
defines the authority that a fiduciary has over digital assets.
Paragraph (a)(ii) declares that “[a] fiduciary with authority
over digital assets or electronic communications of an account
holder under this act . . . has the lawful consent of the account
holder.”142 The comment following this section explains that
this language is intended to ensure that fiduciaries fall under
the “lawful consent” exception to the nondisclosure provisions
of the Stored Communications Act discussed above.143 That
same section clarifies that “[t]he rights of the fiduciary
exercising the account holder’s authority are subject to . . . any
applicable and enforceable terms of service agreement.”144
Significantly, the fifth draft altered section 8 to provide that
any provision in a terms-of-service agreement that limits a
fiduciary’s access to the digital assets of the account holder under
this [act] is void as against the strong public policy of this state,
unless the limitations of that provision are signed by the account
holder separately from the other provisions of the terms-of-service
agreement.145

While attempting to eliminate the terms of the service
agreement as evidence of a decedent’s intent to limit access,146
it seems likely that the service providers will continue to argue
that the assumed consent147 of the account holder to provide
access is a violation of federal law. Thus, the current version of
the Draft Uniform Act is not likely to provide greater access to
e-mail content for fiduciaries as intended by the drafting
committee.
As with the third draft, the fourth version provides little
guidance on whether personal representatives will have access
140. Id. at 7.
141. See DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 93, at 6.
142. Id. at 8.
143. Id. at 10.
144. Id. at 8.
145. MARCH 2014 DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 27, at 11.
146. Several Internet lawyers who commented on the draft do not believe
this language goes far enough in requiring service providers to obtain
decedent’s intent to limit access. See, e.g., Memorandum from Chris Kunz to
Suzy Walsh & Naomi Cahn (Mar. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital
%20Assets/2014mar17_FADA_Comments_Kunz.pdf.
147. MARCH 2014 DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 27, at 11.
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to e-mail. In clarifying that access is subject to the terms of
service agreements, including “to the extent consistent with”
federal law language, and assuming consent on the behalf of
the decedent, this draft does little more than highlight the
murky waters of access to e-mail communication. Because the
consent requirement contained in § 2702(b)(3) is the hot button
issue for the providers, and they have asserted that assumed
consent violates federal law,148 the fourth version of the Draft
Uniform Act will do little to allow greater access to e-mail
content in states where it is adopted.
The comment after section 3 of the May 31, 2013 draft of
the Uniform Act provided one very valuable point of clarity
missing in the current state law and legislation. The comment
notes that:
This section distinguishes the authority of fiduciaries over
digital property subject to this act from any other efforts to access
the digital property. Family members or friends may seek access to
the digital property of others, but such efforts are subject to other
laws and are not covered by this act. Moreover, the fiduciary
exercises authority only on behalf of the account holder.149

Additionally, the comment after section 8 of the most
recent draft provides that “[t]he Act does not permit the
account holder’s fiduciary to override the TOSA [terms of
service agreement] in order to make a digital asset or collection
of digital assets ‘descendible,’ although it does preserve the
rights of the fiduciary to make the same claims as the account
holder.”150 This distinction is very important if it is included to
clarify that this access is for ease of administration and not
because the digital assets are decedents’ property and therefore
a part of the estate to be distributed. If access is limited to
administrative purposes only, personal representatives and
their advisors can avoid the messy choices regarding
distribution described in my critique of state laws in Part IV.A.

148. See supra Part I.B.
149. MAY 2013 DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 123, at 4.
150. MARCH 2014 DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 27, at 13.
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IV. CRITIQUE OF PROVIDERS’ POLICIES, ACCESS LAWS,
AND PRO-ACCESS ARGUMENTS
A. E-MAIL SERVICE PROVIDERS’ POLICIES, STATE LAW, AND
PROPOSED LAW
1. E-mail Service Providers’ Policies
Assuming that the arguments made by NetChoice151 and
the State Privacy & Security Coalition152 set out in their July 8,
2013 letter to the chair of the committee working on the Draft
Uniform Act153 accurately represent the industry’s position on
access to e-mail, Microsoft’s Outlook.com policy is the most
problematic among the three largest providers, and Google’s
Gmail inactive account manager is the most appropriate.
As set forth in the letter and discussed in Part I, the
industry maintains that the Stored Communications Act
prohibits divulging the contents of a communication unless it is
with the “lawful consent” of the originator, an addressee, or an
intended recipient of the communication.154 The trade
associations suggest that consent should not be assumed away,
but should be explicitly granted in the decedent’s will or by the
user when signing up for service.155
Microsoft’s Outlook.com policy, which allows the broadest
access to a wide range of people, appears in a question and
answer forum and not in the terms of service.156 This is
significant because there is no opportunity for consent by the
decedent and very little chance the decedent would discover the
policy granting access without searching for it. Thus, the user
has not agreed to this term, and moreover, most Outlook.com
151. About Us, NETCHOICE, http://netchoice.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 15,
2014) (showing that NetChoice members include Yahoo and AOL).
152. Kate Kaye, Google, AOL and Others Make State Policy Coalition
Official, CLICKZ (Apr. 14, 2008), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/
1709575/google-aol-others-make-state-policy-coalition-official. It is worth
noting that Microsoft may not be a member of the State Privacy & Security
Coalition, but Google and Yahoo are. See id.
153. DelBianco Letter, supra note 60.
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2012).
155. See DelBianco Letter, supra note 60 (“Express consent can most likely
be established in a decedent’s will or if the decedent expressed a preference to
share account information after death in signing up for service.”).
156. See generally My Family Member Died Recently/Is in Coma, What Do
I Need to Do?, supra note 20 (answering a user question regarding a deceased
relative’s account and outlining the “short authentication process” that is
required).
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users are probably completely unaware that all next of kin,
executors, and beneficiaries of their estate could receive a CD
of the content of their e-mail account within seven days of
submitting a request.157 Additionally, because many people
may qualify as next of kin, executor, or beneficiary of an estate,
many people could theoretically have access to the contents of a
decedent’s Outlook account. This may include, in an extreme
circumstance, next of kin who have been specifically
disinherited by a will, minors, or friends of the decedent.
Yahoo’s policy, which provides for account termination
upon the user’s death,158 does not allow for any access, even if a
decedent’s consent to access is clear (for example, when a
decedent has included a provision in his or her will granting
access).159 Additionally, Yahoo’s apparent operating procedure
is to provide access (in the form of digital and paper copies)
upon issuance of a court order.160 The court order in the
Ellsworth case did not conclude that Justin had consented to
access.161 So if Yahoo believes that it is subject to suit under
federal law for “significant statutory damages and attorneys’
fees by third parties who communicated with the decedent and
whose communications are stored in the decedent’s account,”162
it is acting inconsistently when it complies with such a court
order that offers no indemnity for any violation of the Stored
Communications Act.163
Although Google’s Gmail policy does not specify the
reasons why an authorized representative may or may not be
granted access,164 the waiting periods and uncertainty may be

157. Cf. id. (explaining Microsoft’s next of kin process).
158. See Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 4 (“You agree that your Yahoo
account is non-transferable and any rights to your Yahoo ID or contents
within your account terminate upon your death.”).
159. Id. (explaining that upon receipt of a death certificate, the account
may be terminated and all contents deleted).
160. E.g., Dead Marine’s E-mail Raises Legal Issues, supra note 15
(demonstrating Yahoo’s compliance upon the issuance of a court order).
161. See Order to Produce Information, supra note 1 (ordering the
production of content within the decedent’s account without discussing
consent, but documenting that the decedent died intestate).
162. DelBianco Letter, supra note 60.
163. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(c)(1), 2703 (2012) (offering indemnity to service
providers who comply with court orders, but limiting such indemnity to
compliance with orders obtained by a government entity).
164. See Accessing a Deceased Person’s Mail, supra note 20 (outlining the
initial information required to “move beyond Part 1” of review, but stating
that “[p]art 2 will require you to get additional legal documents”).
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enough to deter an authorized representative from seeking
access, especially if access is desired for ease of administration
purposes. Access that is granted, however, is almost certainly a
violation of the Stored Communications Act for the same
reasons discussed above for Outlook.com, i.e., the decedent did
not consent and is likely unaware that access is a possibility.
The new “inactive account manager”165 feature on Gmail is
the only policy or process that is consistent with the industry’s
posture that consent is required by federal law. A user who
finds and participates in the Gmail process has clearly
indicated the circumstances under which he or she consents to
access.166 While most users are probably unaware of this new
feature, among the current options, it is the only effective way
to ascertain the intent of the decedent with regard to the
contents of that particular account. Still, a number of issues
remain. Will Google revise its access policy to require use of the
inactive account manager and deny access otherwise? Will
third-generation state laws that grant blanket access override
a decedent’s choice on the inactive account manager?
2. State Law
With the exception of Rhode Island, which requires that
the personal representative obtain a court order declaring that
the personal representative is the agent for the decedent and
ordering the estate to indemnify the provider from all liability
in complying with the order,167 the state statutes ignore the
issues raised by federal law.168 This failure to address the
federally-mandated duty of service providers to protect the
content of their users’ e-mail accounts places those service
providers in the untenable position of complying with either

165. Inactive Account Manager, supra note 56.
166. See id. (“You might want your data to be shared with a trusted friend
or family member, or, you might want your account to be deleted entirely . . . .
[W]e give you the option of deciding what happens to your data.”). On the
other hand, I am a Gmail user and do not wish for any trusted contacts to be
notified or given access to the contents of my account at any time. The inactive
account manager does not allow for an indication that access is not to be
granted. See id.
167. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-27-3 (West 2011).
168. And, as discussed in Part I.B, under 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) an agent is
only entitled to the recipient’s e-mail, so providing copies of e-mail messages
that the decedent originated (i.e., the “sent mail” folder) under Rhode Island
law is a violation of the Stored Communications Act. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b)(1) (2012).

924

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

federal or state law when access is requested by a personal
representative.
Third-generation
statutes,
which
allow
personal
representatives to “take control of, conduct, continue or
terminate” e-mail accounts and do not carve out exceptions for
when access may be limited,169 will result in litigation when
access has been limited by the decedent in a will, when signing
up for or managing an e-mail account, or through the terms of
service agreement. For instance, if a decedent participated in
Gmail’s inactive account manager feature, provided access to
one individual, and was domiciled in a state with a thirdgeneration-style statute, would the personal representative
also be entitled to access the Gmail account, even though the
decedent had the opportunity to provide access to such person
and did not?
Fourth-generation statutes are an improvement because
access can be limited in particular ways;170 however, the means
to limit access are too narrow. As technology evolves so quickly,
consumers are constantly creating new accounts. To expect a
person to revise his or her will each time a new account is
created in order to limit access to that account is unrealistic
and inefficient. A better statute would allow access to be
limited by a user when signing up for the service or in
managing his or her account. In the example above where
Gmail’s inactive account manager was used, the result under a
fourth-generation access statute will be the same as under a
third-generation access statute state.
Second-generation statutes, that allow for access “where
otherwise authorized,” do the most to discern whether the
decedent consented to access in the way contemplated by the
Stored Communications Act. However, even second-generation
statutes allow access through a court order without requiring
that the court make a finding that the decedent consented to
access and include such a finding in the order.171

169. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28) (West 2011) (establishing
the “take control of, conduct, continue or terminate” language typical of thirdgeneration statutes).
170. See, e.g., H.B. 2580, 196th Gen. Assemb., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012)
(“A personal representative shall have the power, unless the personal
representatives’ authority has been restricted by will or by court order . . . .”).
171. See, e.g., H.B. 116, 163d Gen. Ct., 2013 Sess. (N.H. 2013), A2943,
215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012) (noting that access may be authorized
through court order, without explicitly requiring a finding of consent).
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Providing access to decedents’ e-mail without requiring a
showing of decedents’ intent is a way for legislators to remedy
the cries of constituents who want to hear the last words of
family members, as John Ellsworth shared in his story to the
national media.172 These stories are incredibly compelling, and
often arise after tragic deaths like that of Justin Ellsworth. But
in providing for access absent the explicit consent of the
decedent (and for some, even in the face of explicit nonconsent),
states place service providers between state and federal law
with no way to satisfy both.
Additionally, because state statutes do not indicate which
access-justifying theory is the basis for their law, it is unclear
what personal representatives should do with the e-mail
content once access is granted. Should the e-mail be destroyed,
or should it be distributed to heirs or beneficiaries? A more
detailed discussion of the issues surrounding whether the email is distributed (and to whom) is in Sections B and C.
However awkward a position providers face under state
law, this issue is dwarfed by state laws’ lack of concern for a
foundational (perhaps the foundational) principle of law
governing transfers at death in this country—honoring
decedents’ intent.173 In discussing the Oregon statute, a fourthgeneration type, a practitioner in Ohio writes:
By providing broad definitions, prohibiting destruction of assets,
and releasing companies from liability for disclosure of information
to an authorized representative who presents appropriate
documentation, this proposed law strikes an appropriate balance
between allowing a fiduciary the access he or she needs to
efficiently administer an estate and addressing the custodian’s
concerns about protecting client privacy. As the law continues to
evolve in this area, the Oregon proposal would be an excellent
model for use across the country for legislation that will allow
transfer of digital assets in a similar means to transfer of tangible
ones.174

It is telling that decedents’ interest or intent is not mentioned
as even being on par with fiduciaries’ or providers’ interest. I
will explore this issue more fully in Section C.
Finally, state laws shift an administrative burden (lack of
access to e-mail) to e-mail service providers who must review
court orders, requests, and credentials from personal

172. See Cha, supra note 13.
173. See infra Part IV.B.
174. David Lenz, Death and Downloads: The Evolving Law of Fiduciary
Access to Digital Assets, 23 PROB. L.J. OHIO 7, 11 (2012).
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representatives, and then print e-mail messages, create a
digital copy of e-mail messages, and/or provide a means to log
on and access the account. Nearly ten years ago, then-dominant
e-mail provider AOL told the press that it received “dozens” of
requests per day for access to e-mail and had a full-time
employee dedicated to handling those requests.175 At least one
commentator has suggested that the estate bear the cost of
access, similar to the patient bearing the cost of obtaining a
copy of his or her medical records.176 That makes sense.
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a governmental
entity obtaining the contents of communications, records, or other
information under section 2702, 2703, or 2704 of this title shall pay
to the person or entity assembling or providing such information a
fee for reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably necessary
and which have been directly incurred in searching for,
assembling, reproducing, or otherwise providing such information.
Such reimbursable costs shall include any costs due to necessary
disruption of normal operations of any electronic communication
service or remote computing service in which such information may
be stored.177

State law should require, similar to a governmental entity’s
responsibility for the cost of obtaining records, that estates are
responsible for the cost of obtaining e-mail records.
B. ACCESS REQUIRED TO EASE THE BURDEN OF ESTATE
ADMINISTRATION
There are two problems with justifying access for the
purpose of easing the burden of administration. First, access
will not effectively ease the burden of administration in most
cases.178 Second, once a personal representative is granted
access for administrative reasons, the personal representative
will face a difficult decision about what to do with the contents
of the e-mail account.179

175. Anick Jesdanun, Debates Rise over What Happens to E-belongings
After Owners Die, USA TODAY (Dec. 24, 2004, 12:15 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/ethics/2004-12-24-dataafter-death_x.htm.
176. Tyler G. Tarney, Note, A Call for Legislation to Permit the Transfer of
Digital Assets at Death, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 773, 799–800 (2012).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2012).
178. See Walker & Blachly, supra note 22, at 182–85 (outlining steps to be
considered in administering virtual assets once access has been granted).
179. See id. at 184–85 (recognizing some of the technical and sentimental
difficulties in dealing with and valuing digital assets).
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The difficulties in administration without access to e-mail
(and the ease of administration that would result from access
to e-mail) are overstated. To reality-test the “serious
dilemma”180 that would occur upon the death of an American
adult, I made a chart listing all of my digital assets (I am a
good example of a person who conducts most of my business
online). I receive my electronic (and paperless) account
statements, and my bills are automatically paid from my bank
account or by my credit card every month whenever possible. I
also manage my family finances using an online application. I
have eight e-mail accounts (six personal and two professional),
two password-protected personal computers, a smartphone,
and remote off-site backup for all those devices, plus music
accounts and numerous social media accounts.
In administering my estate after my death, my personal
representative will begin by identifying my assets and my
debts. Supporters of access would argue that my e-mail
contains key information needed to quickly ascertain those
assets and debts. However, after reviewing the list of my digital
property, it is clear that the most efficient means to a clear
picture of my estate is not through my e-mail—it is through my
wallet. By merely going through my wallet, my personal
representative will know where I bank and with whom I have
credit. After presenting the bank and the credit card companies
with proper authority from the probate court, the bank and
credit card companies will provide current and past account
statements. Those statements will give my personal
representative a nearly full picture of my assets and debts. My
personal representative can fill in the remaining gaps by
meeting with my employer and reviewing my tax return and
supporting documents. In the meantime, assuming my credit
cards and bank accounts are closed by my personal
representative and, therefore, automatic bill payment is
rejected, creditors will begin calling my smartphone, and my
personal representative can cancel and transfer accounts at
that time.
On the other hand, assuming access to my e-mail is
granted by my state of domicile, a personal representative
attempting to use my e-mail to ascertain my assets and debts
will first need to contact my e-mail service provider with proper
authority to gain access to my e-mail account. Upon

180. Id. at 182.
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satisfaction of the e-mail service provider, there will be a period
of time before the service provider furnishes the personal
representative with either physical or digital copies of e-mail
messages, the headers of e-mail messages, or control of my email accounts.181 Upon obtaining access to my e-mail
account,182 my personal representative will have knowledge
that other online financial accounts exist, but he or she will not
have access to other online accounts (which have separate
usernames and passwords that will not be discovered in e-mail
messages). At this point my personal representative can either
contact each account provider and present credentials for
access, or he or she can close my bank account and credit cards
as was done in the first scenario with no e-mail access.
The personal representative who relies on the wallet to
identify assets and debts is likely to get the job done more
quickly than, and just as effectively as, the personal
representative who seeks access to e-mail. While commentators
could dream up scenarios under which there would be lost
opportunities because of a lack of access to a sole proprietor’s email account,183 there is a lack of real-life examples of estate
administration where access to e-mail would have made a
significant difference in the execution of a personal
representative’s job. Additionally, the fourth version of the
Draft Uniform Act allows a personal representative to access
records of electronic communication of the decedent.184 Because
the information useful to a personal representative seeking to
marshal assets is likely to be contained in the account records
(such as e-mail addresses of the decedents’ correspondents),
access to content is likely to be irrelevant to a personal
representative in a state that adopts this version of the Draft
Uniform Act.
Access to e-mail is not a magic bullet that will make estate
administration neat and tidy. To the contrary, a more complex
administrative question will arise after access is granted. If
181. See supra Part III (explaining that the statutes, legislation, and Draft
Uniform Act provide for different types of access).
182. Once my personal representative has access of some nature, he or she
may unfortunately discover that my account statements come not to an e-mail
account that I use for correspondence, but to a separate e-mail account of
which they would be unaware—back to square one. But for purposes of this
example, I will assume that my primary e-mail account does in fact receive
paperless account statements.
183. For example, an eBay power seller.
184. DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 93, at 4.
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access is granted for ease of administration (rather than for the
purposes of obtaining the e-mail property of the decedent),
what duty does the personal representative have to distribute
copies of the contents of the e-mail account to heirs or
beneficiaries? Unless the access was granted purely for
administrative purposes,185 the personal representative will be
faced with a difficult decision about what to do with the
contents of the e-mail account. It is inexpensive to reproduce
digital copies of e-mail messages once they are collected by the
service provider, and as we know from reading the compelling
story of John Ellsworth’s quest for access to his son’s e-mail,
there is quite an emotional incentive to share the decedent’s
thoughts and words with those who loved him or her.
Additionally, the disincentive to share access may appear low
since there is no post mortem right to privacy,186 and the
personal representative is the individual who would enforce
such a right anyway.
A personal representative who decides to distribute the
contents of an e-mail account without guidance from a statute
or court is vulnerable to a claim of breach of fiduciary duty or
other claims by those who both favor and oppose
distribution.187 For example, in the Ellsworth case, the court
did not limit the access for administrative purposes only, and,
as a result, Justin’s father presumably had the burden of
distributing Justin’s e-mail to all of his heirs.188 While Justin’s
inbox may not have contained private e-mail messages from his
divorced parents (his heirs), we must admit that many e-mail
accounts do contain these sort of messages, and their
distribution may upset family harmony. Thus, the personal
representative is likely to face substantial pressure to
distribute digital copies of e-mail messages to family members
185. Cf. id. (“This section distinguishes the authority of fiduciaries, who
exercise authority subject to this act only on behalf of the account holder from
any other efforts to access the digital assets and electronic communications.
Family members or friends may seek such access, but, unless they are
fiduciaries, their efforts are subject to other laws and are not covered by this
act.”).
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. b (1977) (“In the
absence of statute, the action for invasion of privacy cannot be maintained
after the death of the individual whose privacy is invaded.”).
187. Those who favor distribution based on the argument that e-mail is
property of the decedent will claim that the personal representative has not
fully performed his duties if e-mail is not distributed. Those who oppose
distribution may argue that their privacy was violated.
188. See Order to Produce Information, supra note 1.
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of the decedent, but he or she also bears the enormous risk of
upsetting personal relationships with the distribution of e-mail
contents. An advisor to a personal representative in a state
with an access law would be wise to instruct the personal
representative to seek guidance from the court before either
distributing or destroying e-mail.
So, while on first blush it may be assumed that access to a
decedent’s
password-protected
e-mail
will
ease
the
administrative burden for the personal representative, e-mail
is not the most effective means to identify and access assets.
Additionally, in allowing access to e-mail for administrative
purposes, the personal representative is in a difficult position of
determining how far to distribute the contents of the account. If
these issues alone are not enough to quash this justification for
access, the next Section will address why a desire for ease of
administration should never defeat a decedent’s intent.
C. ACCESS REQUIRED BECAUSE E-MAIL IS THE PROPERTY OF THE
DECEDENT
The argument that e-mail is property of the decedent is
very compelling and has been well-established by legal
scholars.189 However, it is a long leap to conclude that, because
e-mail is the property of the decedent, heirs are entitled to
receive it.
1. Debate Should Focus on Access by Personal
Representative—Not by Heirs
Preliminarily, it is worth noting that although the
argument made by Darrow and Ferrera (and others) is that
access should be given to “heirs,”190 it is both more efficient and
appropriate, if access is granted, that it be granted to the
decedent’s personal representative. As discussed in Section A,
providing access places a large administrative burden on
internet service providers. If access is granted to beneficiaries,
189. See, e.g., Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 313 (“[A]n e-mail
message is the creation of its author and, as such, should be considered the
author’s property.”).
190. See id. Darrow and Ferrera justify access by “heirs,” finding that
“heirs should be able to inherit e-mail messages just as they would inherit
private letters and other possessions of the deceased.” Id. However, state laws
and legislation, as well as the Draft Uniform Act, grant access to the estate of
the deceased via the personal representative(s). See supra Part III. The
distinction is significant in that a person will only have one estate but may
have many heirs, beneficiaries, or next of kin.

2014]

ACCESS TO DECEDENTS' E-MAIL

931

heirs, or next of kin—in short, anyone other than the personal
representative—the
administrative
burden
increases
substantially for the providers. Twenty-year-old Justin
Ellsworth’s messages from a single e-mail account filled three
bankers boxes.191 An older decedent is likely to have a much
larger volume of e-mail.192
Access by only the personal representative also makes
sense under the law of wills, trusts, and estates—personal
property owned by the decedent is gathered and distributed by
the personal representative instead of being transferred
directly to the beneficiaries or heirs.193 In an intestate estate, a
determination of heirs is completed by the personal
representative,194 and it does not make sense to place that
additional burden on e-mail service providers. Where state
laws and providers’ policies allow access to decedents’ e-mail,
access should be granted to personal representatives. Personal
representatives will then distribute decedents’ property to
beneficiaries under a valid will, or to heirs as provided by law.
2. Intent of Decedent
While the argument that e-mail is the property of the
decedent is strong, commentators almost uniformly focus on
the wrong owner (or potential owner), thus weakening the legal
argument.195 Many articles and arguments tug at the
heartstrings of a sympathetic public but are rooted in the idea
of a beneficiary’s “right to inherit.”196 That concept is misplaced
in modern American jurisprudence. Consider this excerpt from
a student note calling for uniform legislation:
Like Ellsworth, a Marine named Karl Linn communicated with the
outside world solely by sending emails and posting pictures while
he was stationed in Iraq. When he was tragically killed, his
parents immediately contacted the account service provider to
preserve his account. Predictably, the service provider cited its

191. Inventory, supra note 2.
192. For example, I am forty-two years old and have eight active e-mail
accounts.
193. See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(1) (2010) (providing for
transfer to descendants “by representation”).
194. See generally id. § 2-106 (outlining rules of transfer “by
representation”).
195. See, e.g., Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 313–14 (focusing on the
value of e-mail messages to family members in arguing for relaxation of
contract provisions regarding user privacy).
196. See, e.g., id. at 294 (arguing for e-mail messages to be inherited in a
fashion similar to private letters).
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strict privacy policy and refused to comply with the request. [This]
illustrate[s] the value of digital assets to individuals and how
drastic the consequences can be in the absence of legislative
intervention.197

Consider also Professors Darrow and Ferrera’s
recommendation that a uniform law on access attempt to
balance “(1) the privacy and ownership interests of account
holders; (2) the interests of heirs in obtaining the property of
loved ones; and (3) the interests of e-mail service providers in
reducing liability exposure and administrative expenses.”198
They buffer their argument by explaining that where e-mail
messages do not represent significant economic value, “they
may be time capsules of great personal significance.”199
Professors Darrow and Ferrera further argue that “[d]enying
heirs access to the deceased account holder’s e-mail account
creates uncertainty both for those sending e-mail to that
account and for heirs who may be unable to access important
communications.”200
Finally, consider the widespread press attention given to
Justin Ellsworth’s father’s quest to make a scrapbook of
correspondence from his son’s time in Iraq.201
As Professor Wright explains in the first chapter of her
Wills, Trusts, and Estates textbook, “Everyone pretty much
agrees that we all have testamentary freedom . . . .”202 It is
important to distinguish the sound argument that e-mail is the
property of the account holder who has the freedom to dispose
of it, from the misplaced concern for heirs or beneficiaries’
desire to obtain property they consider sentimental. Simply
put, there is no right to inherit sentimental property.203
Comments in the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills
and Other Donative Transfers (the Restatement) describe the
supporting rationale for the construction of donative documents
as the fundamental idea that a person should control the
disposition of his or her property upon his or her death, with

197. Tarney, supra note 176, at 786 (internal citations omitted).
198. Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 317.
199. Id. at 283.
200. Id. at 296.
201. See generally Justin’s Family Fights Yahoo, supra note 13 (containing
links to dozens of articles).
202. WRIGHT, supra note 82, at 5.
203. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmts. a, c (2003) (establishing the importance of the
decedents’ intentions, and not those of the beneficiaries or heirs).
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very limited exceptions.204 The first general principle for
construction is: “The controlling consideration in determining
the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention.
The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent
allowed by law.”205 Similarly, Part I of the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) specifies that a purpose of the UPC is “to discover
and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of
his property.”206 The rules of construction begin with “[i]n the
absence of a finding of a contrary intention.”207
When a decedent leaves no valid will, his or her estate is
subject to the rules of intestate succession.208 Those rules are
based on the decedent’s probable intent, determined by the
choices similarly situated testate decedents make in wills,
surveys, and/or empirical research on intent, as codified in
statutes of descent and distribution.209
Simply put, it is well established that honoring decedents’
intent, or likely intent, is a foundational principle of law
governing transfers at death. Thus, after establishing that email is the property of the decedent, it is appropriate to focus
on the decedent’s intent rather than the heirs’ interest in that
property.
3. When Password Not Shared, Presume Decedent’s Intent to
Destroy
In the context of password-protected e-mail, many presume
that a decedent’s intent, when unknown, would have been to

204. Id. (“The organizing principle of the American law of donative
transfers is freedom of disposition . . . . American law curtails freedom of
disposition only to the extent that the donor attempts to make a disposition or
achieve a purpose that is prohibited or restricted by an overriding rule of
law.”).
205. Id. § 10.1.
206. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b)(2) (2010).
207. Id. § 2-701 (emphasis added).
208. WRIGHT, supra note 82, at 115.
209. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 cmt. (“Empirical studies
support the increase in the surviving spouse’s intestate share, reflected in the
revisions of this section. Studies have shown that testators in smaller estates
(which intestate estates overwhelmingly tend to be) tend to devise their entire
estates to their surviving spouses, even when the couple has children.”); see
also id. § 2-106 cmt. (“[A] recent survey of client preferences, conducted by the
Fellows of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, suggests that
the per-capita-at-each-generation system is preferred by most clients.”); id.
§ 2-109 cmt. (“Most inter-vivos transfers today are intended to be absolute
gifts or are carefully integrated into a total estate plan.”).
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allow access.210 But stronger arguments support the contention
that when a decedent’s intent to allow post mortem access is
not made explicit, we should presume that a decedent did not
intend to grant access.
Why would a decedent want to destroy his or her e-mail?
Consider what will happen to that decedent’s e-mail if it is not
destroyed. Once the personal representative has access to email based on this property theory, the personal representative
will be responsible for distribution of the property.211 The
personal representative has a duty to distribute such property
among the decedent’s heirs or beneficiaries; only access that is
granted exclusively for efficient estate administration would
allow the personal representative to destroy the e-mail when
the estate is closed.212 It cannot be within the personal
representative’s discretion whether to distribute a decedent’s
property and to whom.
A well-advised personal representative knows that he or
she must act quickly or all electronic mail will be “lost.”213 In
fact, a lawyer who does not advise the personal representative
to marshal the e-mail with the other assets may face a claim
for malpractice, and a personal representative who fails to
request access may face a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.214
210. See supra Parts II.B, IV.C.2.
211. See supra Part IV.B.
212. See supra Part II.A.
213. Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 4 (“You agree that Yahoo
may, without prior notice, immediately terminate, limit your access to or
suspend your Yahoo account, any associated e-mail address, and access to the
Yahoo Services. Cause for such termination, limitation of access or suspension
shall include, but not be limited to . . . (e) extended periods of
inactivity . . . . Further, you agree that all terminations, limitations of access
and suspensions for cause shall be made in Yahoo’s sole discretion and that
Yahoo shall not be liable to you or any third party for any termination of your
account, any associated e-mail address, or access to the Yahoo Services.”); see
also Google Terms of Service, supra note 31 (“Google may also stop providing
Services to you . . . at any time . . . . If we discontinue a Service, where
reasonably possible, we will give you reasonable advance notice and a chance
to get information out of that Service.”); Microsoft Services Agreement, supra
note 31 (“The Microsoft branded services require that you sign into
your Microsoft account periodically, at a minimum every 270 days, to keep
the Microsoft branded services portion of the services active, unless provided
otherwise in an offer for a paid portion of the services. If you fail to sign in
during this period, we may cancel your access to the Microsoft branded
services. If the Microsoft branded services are canceled due to your failure to
sign in, your data may be permanently deleted from our servers.”).
214. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 82, at 892–97 (summarizing various
states’ laws on duties owed by probate attorneys to beneficiaries and others).

2014]

ACCESS TO DECEDENTS' E-MAIL

935

Once the personal representative has access—and let’s
assume that for expense reasons the e-mail service providers
give electronic copies and not a garage full of bankers boxes—a
large number of people may be entitled to a copy of that
electronic data. If the decedent was intestate, and most people
die intestate,215 it will be all of the heirs who are entitled to
access. Because very few people have specific bequests
concerning virtual assets in their wills,216 a testate decedent’s
electronic data would likely pass to the residual beneficiaries,
who may or may not be a spouse or descendants.217
Thus, granting access to personal representatives is akin
to granting access to heirs and beneficiaries, because once the
personal representative has the digital copies (or a garage full
of bankers boxes), the e-mail is unlikely to ever be destroyed—
it will be passed down, perhaps duplicated, and read by whoknows-who. E-mail, unlike Grandma’s favorite teapot, may be
reproduced an unlimited number of times and is inexpensive to
store in digital format.
Once the electronic data is in the hands of heirs or
beneficiaries, what will they do with it? Search for their name?
(“Had a frustrating conversation with Marsha today. Her
marriage is in real trouble.”) Keep it? While I do not want to
read my father’s e-mail messages—much less make a
scrapbook out of them—I also cannot imagine making the
decision to permanently delete the record of his daily thoughts
and activity that his e-mail represents. Will our greatgrandchildren be reading our e-mail messages sixty years from
now? (“Those e-mails from great-granddad sure are funny—but
I wonder what ‘bootylicious’ means . . . .”) Access to e-mail
poses a real risk to the fabric of relationships.
The best argument that we should presume decedents’
intent to destroy is perhaps the most obvious: the decedent did

215. Kim Klein, You Should Have a Will, APPALACHIAN COMMUNITY FUND,
http://www.loosebrown.com/cases/legal-malpractice-cases/legal-malpracticecase-1.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (“[S]even out of ten people don’t have a
will . . . .”).
216. In my decade of experience as an estate planning attorney, I never
wrote or saw a donative document that dealt specifically with virtual assets.
217. For example, residual beneficiaries may be siblings, parents, nieces,
nephews, friends, and charities. E.g., Make a Difference to Wildlife in Your
Will, WILDLIFE REHABILITATION CENTER MINN., http://www.wrcmn.org/
Planned_Giving.php (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (suggesting that the reader
make the charity Wildlife Rehabilitation Center of Minnesota a residual
beneficiary).

936

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

not share his or her password. Sharing a password would
demonstrate a user’s intent to share access to an account.
Conversely, keeping a password confidential indicates a desire
to keep the account confidential. It is unreasonable to presume
that a user who did not want others to access his or her
accounts during his or her lifetime would intend for access to be
granted at the moment of death. When Justin Ellsworth agreed
to Yahoo’s terms of service, chose a password, and chose not to
share that password, it is reasonable to assume that he did not
want the contents of his e-mail account to be accessed after his
death for scrapbooking or any other purpose.
If I sent a particular message to my sister, and not to my
brother, it stands to reason that I don’t want to share those
thoughts with my brother. Thus, shouldn’t we assume that a
decedent has already shared the thoughts contained in e-mail
messages with the people who he or she wanted to share them?
To give a third person access to an e-mail message, an
account holder can either forward the message to the third
party, share the account password with the third party, print
the e-mail message (making it tangible personal property), or
save the message to a hard drive (making it accessible through
tangible personal property). If a decedent chose not to share the
e-mail in any of those four ways, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the e-mail is either not important, or something
the decedent preferred to keep private. Indeed, dying without
divulging an e-mail password is akin to ordering destruction of
property, or entering into a contract to destroy property upon a
certain event (death).
Darrow and Ferrera use bailment as a framework to justify
access to e-mail by heirs.218 Under the law of bailment, the
successor in interest to the bailor can recover the property from
the bailee even without knowing the secret password.219
However, an heir without an e-mail password is an entirely
different animal from an heir without a safe deposit box key or
warehouse receipt, for several reasons. First, we must look at
the difference in the property. A warehouse or a safe deposit
box holds tangible personal property, likely of some value or
significance because the service being paid for by the owner of
such property is secure storage of the property. In the case of e218. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
219. Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 302 (“Bailed property must be
returned to the bailor, or at least disposed of according to her directions.”
(citations omitted)).
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mail, the account owner is primarily engaging the service
provider to transmit or receive the property, not to store it. Email has by its very nature more than one copy—both the
author and the recipient have a copy. There may be a
secondary desire to store e-mail, but the difference between the
two is significant: there is only one purpose in securing a safe
deposit box (safe storage) versus the primary purpose of an email account (transmission).
Second, in the case of a warehouse or a safe deposit box,
the heir is dealing with a “lost” key or receipt. It is
unreasonable to assume that a deceased person would destroy
or hide a warehouse receipt or safe deposit key in order to
destroy the tangible property in the warehouse or safe deposit
box. To the contrary, most people would reasonably assume
that in absence of a key or receipt, ownership could be
established in some other way after the death of the property
owner. A password, however, is kept secret precisely to keep
other people from gaining access; therefore, it stands to reason
that if a password cannot be found after a decedent’s death, the
password was not “lost” but kept secret.
When the owner of an e-mail account dies without printing
e-mail, forwarding e-mail, saving e-mail on a computer hard
drive, or sharing the password to the e-mail account, it is
entirely reasonable to assume that the owner believed the
property would be destroyed upon the death of the password
holder(s). There are a number of simple ways that an owner of
an e-mail account can ensure that others have access to copies
of incoming or outgoing e-mails after the owner’s death; if an
owner chooses not to take any of these actions, it makes sense
to assume that the owner did not intend for anyone to have
access to the contents of the account after the owner’s death.
In the case of Yahoo, additional evidence of the account
holders’ intent is in the terms of service. The terms of service,
provided by the service provider and agreed to by the user,
modify the user’s property rights by agreement. Specifically,
Yahoo’s terms of service terminate the rights to the copy (not
the copyright) at the death of the user.220 The fact that this
term is contained in a contract to which the decedent agreed
adds to the argument that the decedent intended for access to
be denied. Darrow and Ferrera address this argument by
saying that,

220. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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[a]lthough the explicit and clearly expressed intent of account
holders requesting that account content not be transferred to heirs
should be respected under general principles of freedom of
contract, boilerplate provisions in contracts of adhesion drafted by
e-mail service providers should not be allowed to rewrite probate
laws such that heirs are unable to inherit what would otherwise be
inheritable.221

Darrow and Ferrera agree that “explicit instructions” by the
account holder should bar access (and that terms of service do
not count as explicit instructions), but given how easy it is to
give access, I argue that the default rule should be the opposite:
without explicit instructions to give access, access should be
denied. The presumption should be that the decedent intended
e-mail to be destroyed by the service provider in the absence of
the decedent’s clear consent to access.
4. The Right to Destroy
When it comes to my own e-mail, I am certain that I do not
want copies in the hands of heirs and beneficiaries. I want my
e-mail to be destroyed at my death. But do I have the right to
contract with the e-mail service provider for its destruction?
Testamentary freedom of disposition is limited by
overriding rules of law. The Restatement provides the following
illustrative list: “those relating to spousal rights; creditors’
rights; unreasonable restraints on alienation or marriage;
provisions promoting separation or divorce; impermissible
racial or other categoric restrictions; provisions encouraging
illegal activity; and the rules against perpetuities and
accumulations.”222

221. Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 314.
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (2003). The comment proceeds:
American law curtails freedom of disposition only to the extent
that the donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve a purpose
that is prohibited or restricted by an overriding rule of law. The term
“rule of law” is used in a broad sense to include rules and principles
derived from the U.S. Constitution, a state constitution, or public
policy; rules and principles set forth in federal or state legislation or
in municipal ordinances; rules and principles of the common law and
of equity; and rules and principles contained in governmental
regulations. A rule of law is an overriding rule of law if it is applicable
and prohibits or restricts the disposition or purpose that the donor
intends.
Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of
disposition in certain instances are those relating to spousal rights;
creditors’ rights; unreasonable restraints on alienation or marriage;
provisions promoting separation or divorce; impermissible racial or
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An unsettled issue within contemporary will doctrine is
whether public policy favoring the most productive use of
assets overrides a decedent’s right to order destruction of his or
her property upon his or her death. If a decedent’s intent to
destroy is clear, is the public policy interest important enough
to override intent? No, it is not, argues one commentator:
[S]ince courts give effect to the doctrine of public policy only to
protect the interests of beneficiaries or the state, it cannot be said
to be a solid basis for prohibiting the destruction of property. It is a
doctrine that is not clearly grounded in any legal principle except a
general sense of equity. Moreover, there are no good public policy
reasons to forbid testamentary destruction of inanimate property,
outside of a generalized capitalistic instinct focusing on the
monetary rather than the personal value of an item.223

While courts tend to overlook a right to destroy in cases
where the asset to be destroyed is of significant financial value
(for instance, a house),224 scholars have argued that there must
be a right to destroy property by the creator of that property.225
Professor Strahilevitz, in his comprehensive analysis of the
right to destroy, concludes that “[t]here are, in short, strong
reasons to defer to the destructive wishes of those who have
created cultural property, particularly when that property has
not been published or publicly displayed. As long as the creator
possesses testamentary capacity, deferring to destructive
wishes in a will is appropriate.”226 Professor Strahilevitz
explains, “empowering owners to destroy their own property
can promote important expressive interests, spur creative
activity, and enhance social welfare.”227 He specifically
mentions e-mail as an example of this phenomenon.228 This is
especially true when the property is of a personal nature. As

other categoric restrictions; provisions encouraging illegal activity;
and the rules against perpetuities and accumulations. The foregoing
list is illustrative, not exhaustive.
Id.
223. Sykas, supra note 87, at 944.
224. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781,
799 (2005) (“In [ ] home destruction cases, a number of third-party interests
were invoked to justify restricting a testator’s right to destroy . . . .”).
225. Id. at 784 (describing Joseph Sax’s Playing Darts with a Rembrandt
as excepting the owner-creator from a general rule prohibiting destruction of
one’s own property).
226. Id. at 835.
227. Id. at 785.
228. Id. at 815 (noting e-mail as an example of an “area in which incentives
for the creation of valuable property might depend on the presence of a robust
right to destroy”).
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another commentator explains, “in cases concerning items of
highly personal property such as diaries, personal writings,
notes, and other items, destruction ought to be permitted.
Those items are inseparably linked with their owner/creator’s
personhood, and as such have no recognizable value to another
person.”229
Advocates for access may argue that irreplaceable cultural
and sentimental information is lost to society when decedents
are allowed to order destruction of their property upon their
death.230 This concern may be outweighed, however, by our
public policy interest in personal freedom and development.
Professor Strahilevitz continues:
While waste prevention is a valid basis for restricting one’s right to
destroy, an analysis of the case law suggests that courts often fail
to appreciate the ways in which protecting the right to destroy can
enhance social welfare by protecting privacy, creating open spaces,
encouraging innovation and creation, or promoting candor and risk
taking.231

And another commentator adds:
If the origins of the public policy doctrine stem from the court’s
desire to prevent injury to society, then the holdings in most of the
cases concerning the destruction of inanimate property are suspect.
The decisions in those cases protect the interests of the beneficiary
or the value of the estate, only one segment of society, at the
expense of the testator’s intent. It is the testator’s intent that
ought to be of paramount importance for two reasons. First, wills
have been important since nearly the beginning of time.
Subsequently, the feature common to all wills that has remained
essentially unchanged, allowing a testator to dispose of his
property in a way he sees fit, emphasizes the importance of
preserving the testator’s control over his property. Secondly, people
define themselves and their personhood through ownership of
inanimate objects. Consequently, people need to control those
objects in order to continue to develop themselves as people, which
permits them to contribute value to society as a whole.232

Additionally, the danger of losing unique and valuable
information is overstated. The idea that the e-mail account of
the decedent contains property that is unique and irreplaceable
is not compelling. By design there are at least two copies of
every “sent” e-mail message: one arrives in the recipient’s
inbox, and one remains in the sender’s “sent mail” folder. A
person who corresponded with the decedent who wishes to
229.
230.
231.
232.

Sykas, supra note 87, at 938 (citation omitted).
Strahilevitz, supra note 224, at 784–85.
Id. at 786.
Sykas, supra note 87, at 943.
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share copies of the correspondence with the heirs or
beneficiaries of the decedent may do so. If heirs and
beneficiaries do not have access to the decedent’s e-mail, it is
because at least two people (the sender and the recipient)
declined to share the e-mail, not because there was no other
way to access the decedents’ correspondence.
In examining the story of Karl Linn quoted above,233 what
is the real loss? That Karl Linn’s parents couldn’t see the
private communications their son had with other people? Every
e-mail message that Karl Linn sent was in the possession of at
least one other person. The recipients of those e-mails are free
to share them with Mr. Linn’s parents, if they feel it is
appropriate. Publicly posted photos can be copied or
downloaded from the website where they appear. And Mr.
Linn’s parents were in possession of all correspondence
between Mr. Linn and them. To be clear, Karl Linn’s death was
tragic234 and his parents are not at moral fault for seeking
access; however, commentators grossly exaggerate what is lost
when e-mail content cannot be accessed.
It is also important to note that I have access to all the email messages that were sent to me—if I want to remember
famous fatherly advice from my own father, Dr. John Godbey, I
can look in my own e-mail account. I do not need access to his
account to find the e-mail messages he sent to me. And if I
want my daughter to have the benefit of this advice, I can print
those e-mail messages, download them, forward them, or share
the password to my account with her.
V. CONCLUSION AND AN ALTERNATIVE DEFAULT RULE
Justin Ellsworth’s death at age twenty was tragic, and his
father was certainly motivated by love and grief in seeking
access to Justin’s e-mail. But while some commentators called
John Ellsworth’s request for access to his son’s e-mail
“seemingly innocuous,”235 it strikes me as surprisingly contrary
to the decedent’s intent or likely intent. We may never know
what argument convinced the judge in the Ellsworth case to
order Yahoo to give Justin’s e-mail to his father,236 but none of
233. See supra text accompanying note 197.
234. See supra text accompanying note 197.
235. Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 22, at 281.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 13–14; supra Part II.B (citing
efficient estate administration, the media cited sentimental reasons, and most
scholars commonly justify access by classifying e-mail as property that should
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the justifications cited to grant access are compelling enough to
override decedents’ intent in a probate matter, or to grant
personal representatives default access to decedents’ passwordprotected e-mail by legislation.237
While it may not be prudent for a variety of reasons, e-mail
is used today as an alternative to the telephone. E-mail is not
like your grandparents’ love letters tied up in a ribbon and kept
in a hope chest in the attic. E-mail is more like notes passed in
high school that we would rip into tiny pieces after reading to
be certain the words were never read again. As noted in an
article in the Washington Post, “[c]omplicating such disputes is
the very nature of e-mail, which many consider to be more
personal and informal than regular letters; some even use it to
correspond anonymously, to hide aspects of their lives they may
not want revealed to others.”238
I am not unique in that regard.239 In addition to seemingly
innocuous messages from my mobile phone provider, credit
card company, employer, and our community garden listserv,
my e-mail accounts, for example, contain messages from dating
services, various people I dated prior to my marriage, highly
personal messages to and from my spouse, messages regarding
my boss, my spouse’s ex-spouse, our child, our parents, and our
siblings. It contains e-mail messages to and from friends
regarding their marriages, their children, their partners, and
our other friends. Those messages sit in my e-mail accounts
and have not been deleted because deleting them takes effort—
and like most people, I assume that there is minimal danger of
leaving them there. After all, I have protected the accounts
with passwords, and, with the exception of my husband, I have
guarded those passwords with the assumption that when I die,
that treasure trove of my and my confidants’ correspondence
will die with me. If I stop to consider the fact that the subjects
of some of those highly personal e-mail messages (who are heirs
apparent, beneficiaries, and nominated as personal
representative in my Last Will and Testament) may have
access, I am faced with some inconvenient alternatives: (i)

pass to heirs or beneficiaries like other property owned by the decedent);
Order to Produce Information, supra note 1 (showing no indication as to the
reason access was ordered).
237. See supra note 16.
238. Cha, supra note 13.
239. Cf. Strahilevitz, supra note 224, at 815 (implying that individuals use
e-mails to discuss “controversial” and “sensitive matters”).
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delete all of my old e-mail messages and e-mail messages as
they come in; (ii) leave explicit instructions that the account is
to be deleted in my Last Will and Testament and hope that my
instructions are carried out;240 and/or (iii) cease using e-mail for
personal communications.
There is an easier way to ensure that my intent is carried
out. One sort of proposal, not currently reflected in any of the
state laws, is that digital assets, including e-mail accounts,
could be transferred under a Last Will and Testament and that
access could be denied through a valid will.241 If an account
user name was not mentioned in the will specifically, then
access would be denied.242 While this would clearly convey the
decedent’s intent for accounts included in the document, from a
practical perspective it is not ideal. First of all, the vast
majority of Americans die intestate.243 Indeed, every accessrelated example discussed in this Article stemmed from an
intestate estate.244 This proposal would not provide further
clarity in those situations. Second, people create new e-mail
accounts (and other online accounts) frequently.245 Requiring
testators to update their wills every time they create a new
account is an unreasonable financial burden.246
Instead, I propose the following default rules, which are
based on the principle of honoring decedents’ intent or likely
intent, and which are consistent with federal law. E-mail is the
property of the account holder. Access may be authorized (i) in
the decedent’s Last Will and Testament; (ii) by the decedent
opting-in to a provider’s program like Gmail’s inactive account
manager where consent is explicitly given by the decedent; (iii)
by a court order after a finding that the decedent consented to
240. See supra Part IV.C.4 (discussing a decedent’s right to destroy).
241. See Tarney, supra note 176, at 795.
242. Id. at 797.
243. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 10.
245. Cf. THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., E-MAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2013–
2017, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2013), available at http://www.radicati.com/wp/
wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Email-Statistics-Report-2013-2017-ExecutiveSummary.pdf (noting that the average annual growth rate of e-mail accounts
is expected to be six percent over the next four years, from 3.9 billion accounts
currently to 4.9 billion accounts by 2017).
246. See, e.g., What Is a Reasonable Fee to Just Update a Will, Power of
Attorney, and Living Will?, AVVO, http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/what-isa-reasonable-fee-to-just-update-a-will—po-339698.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2014) (“It will vary by attorney of course, but it would probably be a couple
hundred dollars.”).
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access by one or more persons; or (iv) if the decedent shared the
password. Additionally, a personal representative who
distributes the e-mail to the persons selected by the decedent
(or to heirs and all living beneficiaries if access is authorized by
the decedent but not limited to certain people) has fully
discharged his or her duties with regard to e-mail. Finally, the
estate of the decedent should bear the cost of any such
authorized access.
In the absence of consent to access in one of those four
manners, the presumption should be that the decedent
intended that the e-mail communication be destroyed upon his
or her death, and access should not be granted.
STATE STATUTES REGARDING ACCESS
TO DECEDENTS’ E-MAIL
As of November 1, 2013
Connecticut247
An electronic mail service provider shall provide, to the
executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased person
who was domiciled in this state at the time of his or her death,
access to or copies of the contents of the electronic mail account
of such deceased person upon receipt by the electronic mail
service provider of: (1) A written request for such access or
copies made by such executor or administrator, accompanied by
a copy of the death certificate and a certified copy of the
certificate of appointment as executor or administrator; or (2)
an order of the court of probate that by law has jurisdiction of
the estate of such deceased person.
Idaho248
Except as restricted or otherwise provided by the will or by
an order in a formal proceeding and subject to the priorities
stated in section 15-3-902 of this code, a personal
representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the
interested persons, may properly:
....
(28) Take control of, conduct, continue or terminate any
accounts of the decedent on any social networking website, any

247. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a(b) (West 2013).
248. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28) (West 2011).
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microblogging or short message service website or any e-mail
service website.
Indiana249
(b) A custodian shall provide to the personal representative of
the estate of a deceased person, who was domiciled in Indiana
at the time of the person’s death, access to or copies of any
documents or information of the deceased person stored
electronically by the custodian upon receipt by the custodian of:
(1) a written request for access or copies made by the
personal representative, accompanied by a copy of the
death certificate and a certified copy of the personal
representative’s letters testamentary; or
(2) an order of a court having probate jurisdiction of the
deceased person’s estate.
(c) A custodian may not destroy or dispose of the electronically
stored documents or information of the deceased person for two
(2) years after the custodian receives a request or order under
subsection (b).
Nevada250
Section 1. Chapter 143 of [Nevada Revised Statutes] is
hereby amended by adding thereto a new section to read as
follows:
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, subject to
such restrictions as may be prescribed in the will of a decedent
or by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, a personal
representative has the power to direct the termination of any
account of the decedent, including, without limitation:
(a) An account on any:
(1) Social networking Internet website;
(2) Web log service Internet website;
(3) Microblog service Internet website;
(4) Short message service Internet website; or
(5) Electronic mail service Internet website; or
(b) Any similar electronic or digital asset of the decedent.
2. The provisions of subsection 1 do not authorize a
personal representative to direct the termination of any

249. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-13-1.1(b)–(c) (LexisNexis 2007).
250. S.B. 131, 2013 Leg., 77th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013) (enacted).
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financial account of the decedent, including, without limitation,
a bank account or investment account.
3. The act by a personal representative to direct the
termination of any account or asset of a decedent pursuant to
subsection 1 does not invalidate or abrogate any conditions,
terms of service or contractual obligations the holder of such an
account or asset has with the provider or administrator of the
account, asset or Internet website.
Oklahoma251
The executor or administrator of an estate shall have the
power, where otherwise authorized, to take control of, conduct,
continue, or terminate any accounts of a deceased person on
any social networking website, any microblogging or short
message service website or any e-mail service websites.
Rhode Island252
An electronic mail service provider shall provide, to the
executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased person
who was domiciled in this state at the time of his or her death,
access to or copies of the contents of the electronic mail account
of such deceased person upon receipt by the electronic mail
service provider of:
(1) A written request for such access or copies made by
such executor or administrator, accompanied by a copy of the
death certificate and a certified copy of the certificate of
appointment as executor and administrator; and
(2) An order of the court of probate that by law has
jurisdiction of the estate of such deceased person, designating
such executor or administrator as an agent for the subscriber,
as defined in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2701, on behalf of his/her estate, and ordering that the
estate shall first indemnify the electronic mail service provider
from all liability in complying with such order.
Virginia253
A. A personal representative of a deceased minor who was
domiciled in the Commonwealth at the time of his death may
assume the deceased minor’s terms of service agreement for a
251. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 269 (West 2010).
252. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-27-3 (West 2011).
253. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110 (West 2013).
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digital account with an Internet service provider,
communications service provider, or other online account
service provider for purposes of consenting to and obtaining the
disclosure of the contents of the deceased minor’s
communications and subscriber records pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702 unless such access is contrary to the express provisions
of a will, trust instrument, power of attorney, or court order.
Such access shall be subject to the same license, restrictions, or
legal obligations of the deceased minor.
B. An Internet service provider, communications service
provider, or other online account service provider shall provide
to the personal representative access to the deceased minor’s
communications and subscriber records pursuant to subsection
A within 60 days from the receipt of (i) a written request for
such access by the personal representative and (ii) a copy of the
death certificate of the deceased minor. However, if the
Internet service provider, communications service provider, or
other online account service provider receives notice of a claim
or dispute regarding providing access to the deceased minor’s
communications and subscriber records pursuant to this
subsection, such provider is not required to comply with any
written request received pursuant to this subsection until a
final nonappealable judgment is rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction determining the rights in or entitlement
to any content in the deceased minor’s digital account.
C. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require an
Internet service provider, communications service provider, or
other online account service provider to disclose any
information in violation of any applicable state or federal law.
D. No person may maintain a cause of action against an
Internet service provider, communications service provider, or
other online account service provider for acting in compliance
with this section.
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